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| Dad and a Buddy |
Officially the Battle of the Bulge began on December 16,
1944 and ended on January 25, 1945. But there were many skirmishes from
mid-September in the region called the Lorraine Mountains leading up to the
actual full-on attack by Hitler’s Troops.
Dad doesn’t report any real details about how it was to be
in Patton’s Army, or anything about the actual war effort, or his activities in
that regard. I assume that is because he and other soldiers were under orders
not to divulge very much and that he wanted to make his sister and Mom feel
like everything was just a cake walk.
I know that Dad was a Field Lineman and from my reading I
also know that being a Field Lineman Battle of
Lorraine…which we now refer to as The Battle of the Bulge. I know
that this is a lot of words and if you are not really that interested, please bear
with me and I promise the next posts will be back to Dad’s “letters from a foxhole.”
during the time of battle was not a “cake
walk.” So, with this post I am going to take a bit of diversion from just posting
Dad’s letters and put a rather lengthy post/overview of the
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| Field Linemen Doing their Jobs |
Before I post this, I am also pleased to say that the 80th
Veterans Association, which is the oldest Veterans Association in America asked
me to write a short article about my Dad and this blog. I have done that, and
it will be published in a future issue of their Blueridge Magazine. In
addition, they asked me to become a member of the Association, which I have
proudly done.
Most of what is written below is based on the historical
work of William E. Welsh.
By mid-September 1944, the U.S. Third Army was poised to
strike at the soft underbelly of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich along a fabled
corridor in northeastern France used for centuries by armies tramping across
Europe.
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| Bradley Left-Patton-Center-Eddy Right |
Two days earlier, Patton had told Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy that
his XII Corps would lead the way. “I was certainly very full of hopes and saw
myself crossing the Rhine,” Patton said.
But various factors were at work to derail those hopes. A
severe shortage of fuel in the early days of September slowed Third Army’s
advance to a crawl, giving the Germans time to rush reinforcements from as far
away as Italy to cover thinly defended sectors. By the time the Third Army had
gained a firm foothold on the east bank of the Moselle in mid-September, the
masterminds of the German high command had hatched plans for a bold strike to
regain the initiative.
Out of a morning mist that clung like a tight-fitting
garment to field and forest on September 18 rumbled factory-fresh Panther tanks
toward a thin screen of men and machines guarding the Third Army’s right flank
at Lunéville, in the northeast corner of France. With their high-velocity guns,
the Panthers easily knocked out the Yanks’ vehicles. Panzergrenadier formations
then swept forward to clear American antitank, machine-gun, and rifle
positions.
The attack, which came as a complete surprise, was being
orchestrated by one of the Third Reich’s most talented panzer leaders, the
diminutive General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, whom Hitler had
plucked from the Eastern Front with his staff to drive Patton’s forces back
across the Moselle. Manteuffel’s goal, as head of the 5th Panzer Army on the
Western Front, was to transform Lunéville into a base from which to roll up
Third Army’s flank on the east bank of the river. The fight that began that
morning touched off an 11-day running tank battle that raged across the hills
of southern Lorraine and tested the resourcefulness of two of World War II’s
most gifted practitioners of the art of mobile warfare.
Patton’s Command Under Bradley
Patton arrived in France exactly one month after the D-Day
invasion to set up the operational command for Third Army. His training and
experience in cavalry operations and his experience serving with the U.S. tank
forces in World War I served as solid preparation for the challenges he would
face as a commander when the United States declared war on Japan and Germany in
December 1941.
Patton had served with competence and distinction with the
U.S. forces throughout Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Against
light opposition, he had secured Morocco during the opening phase of Torch and
ably led the U.S. II Corps when selected to replace Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredenhall
after the debacle at Kasserine Pass.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the supreme commander
of Allied forces in North Africa at the time, picked Patton to lead the U.S.
Seventh Army in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. In little more than a
month’s time, Patton, together with his archrival British General Bernard L.
Montgomery, commanding the British Eighth Army, liberated the strategic island
from Axis control.
Patton might have been destined to oversee U.S. forces in
the invasion of France the following year, but his inability to control his
emotional outbursts and a personal sense of honor and duty that blocked him
from sympathizing with the trials and tribulations of frontline troops caused
him to stumble. In a widely publicized incident, he slapped and cursed a
soldier suffering from battle fatigue in a field hospital in front of staff and
patients. The media and public back home were outraged that a general would
treat an enlisted man in such a manner. As a result, Eisenhower ordered him to
make a personal apology to the soldier and also to everyone present at the time
of the incident.
Patton was chomping at the bit to get at the Germans as soon
as he arrived in France, and Bradley received permission from Ike to activate
Third Army on August 1. Following the disaster at the Falaise Gap in August,
where the Germans suffered 300,000 casualties, resistance had been light as the
surviving German units raced east toward better defensive ground in the
Ardennes and Alsace-Lorraine regions. Because of the heavy losses the Germans had
sustained after the Normandy breakout, the Allies enjoyed a substantial
advantage over the Germans in equipment, which amounted to a 2-to-1 advantage
in artillery and nearly a 20-to-1 advantage in tanks.
As Patton’s Third Army approached the Meuse River in late
August, it paused before pushing into the Lorraine region. Third Army, which
formed the right wing of Bradley’s 12th Army Group, was composed of Maj. Gen.
Walton Walker’s XX Corps and Eddy’s XII Corps. Walker’s corps consisted of the
5th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 7th Armored Division, while Eddy’s
corps, at that time, consisted of the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions and the
4th and 6th Armored Divisions. Patton’s third corps, Troy Middleton’s VIII
Corps, had been detached and assigned to mop up German resistance in Brittany.
Using speed to its advantage, Third Army roared across two
bridges over the Meuse River on August 31 before German forces could demolish
them and slow the American advance. But Patton’s dash ground to a halt shortly
after it crossed the Meuse. This was because Third Army, and the other Allied
armies racing to its north, had stretched their supply lines until they
snapped. Despite efforts to rush fuel to the frontline units, the Allies were still
receiving their fuel from supply dumps in Normandy. By August 30, Patton’s army
was receiving only about 32,000 of the 400,000 gallons of fuel it required to
run all of its tanks and vehicles. For a five-day period at the beginning of
September, Patton’s Third Army remained idle as German forces to their east
regrouped and entrenched behind the Moselle.
Eisenhower’s Two-Pronged Offensive in Lorraine
Eisenhower issued orders in late August to all of his top
commanders outlining a two-pronged offensive against western Germany in which
the principal targets were the Ruhr and Saar industrial areas. The bulk of men
and supplies would be detailed for the primary thrust toward the Ruhr in the
north, but a secondary thrust through Lorraine was considered worth undertaking
to stretch German forces along the Western Front.
The task before Third Army was to establish bridgeheads
across the Moselle that would enable it to capture the two strategic towns.
From there, Third Army would advance along a northeast route of march toward
the fortified West Wall. Once it captured the section of the West Wall
protecting the Saar factories, Third Army’s next objective would be to cross
the Rhine and seize Frankfurt. It was a daunting series of objectives, but
Patton relished the opportunity. Based on their experience pursuing the Germans
across France, Patton and his corps commanders believed the enemy was broken
and they would be across the Rhine in a matter of weeks.
While waiting for fuel to arrive with which to resume his
eastward advance, Patton received good news from Bradley on September 4 that he
would soon receive reinforcements in the form of Maj. Gen. Wade Haislip’s XV
Corps, which would guard his right flank against German forces retreating up
the Rhone Valley. That same day Third Army received about 240,000 gallons of
fuel, which was sufficient to resume its advance the following day.
Patton immediately issued orders to Eddy and Walker to
proceed with reconnaissance-in-force missions to determine the best points at
which to cross the Moselle. Eddy’s XII Corps, on the right flank, began moving
up to the Moselle that same day, and Walker’s XX Corps, on the left flank,
started its advance the following day. Eddy was tasked with locating possible
crossing points above and below Nancy, while Walker was instructed to do the
same above and below Metz. Both corps commanders had received intelligence
reports that two Panzergrenadier divisions, the 3rd and 17th, were prepared to
contest the crossing, and that they would likely be reinforced by surviving
elements of the 21st Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions. By September 7, U.S.
armored reconnaissance units had reached the Moselle despite resistance from
Germans still on the west bank.
The German Force Opposing Patton
At the beginning of September, Patton’s Third Army was close
enough to Germany to alarm Hitler.
To protect the fatherland, Hitler ordered
all German forces on the Western Front to hold their positions on the Moselle
to allow engineers to make much-needed improvements to the West Wall
fortifications.
Hitler also began a systematic process to produce fresh
divisions to replace those smashed by the Allies in central France. On
September 2, Hitler issued orders for the creation of 25 new divisions, most of
which were to be given the designation of Volksgrenadier. In addition, he
ordered the creation of 10 new panzer brigades, numbered 101 to 110, each of
which would boast a battalion of approximately 45 Panther tanks. A follow-on
series of panzer brigades, numbered above 110, would contain a battalion of
Panthers and a battalion of Mark IVs. Hitler also reappointed General Field
Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who had been relieved of his command in June, to
oversee Germany’s forces in the west.
Because the raising of fresh Volksgrenadier divisions and
panzer brigades would take time, Hitler transferred two crack divisions,
General Hans Hecker’s 3rd Panzergrenadier and General-Lieutenant Eberhard
Rodt’s 15th Panzergrenadier, by train from the Italian front. Although Hecker’s
division was at nearly full strength, Rodt’s had been depleted as a result of
nearly a year of hard fighting.
Most of the forces opposite Patton’s Third Army belonged to
the German First Army, which was part of General-Colonel Johannes Blaskowitz’s
Army Group G. Hitler planned to increase the forces opposite Patton to the
point that they would be capable of launching a strong counterattack that would
rock Third Army back on its heels.
Building Up For a Counterattack
In preparation for his counterattack, Hitler made several
key command changes. On September 6, he sacked First Army commander General der
Infanterie Kurt Chevallerie in favor of General der Panzertruppen Otto
Knobelsdorff, who would lead German forces covering the line from Sedan to
Nancy. Hitler also made preparations for the creation of a new Fifth Army to be
led by Manteuffel.
With his surprise counteroffensive, General der
Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel proved a worthy opponent to Patton.
Until sufficient forces were gathered for the counterattack,
the frontline troops were ordered to defend as many crossing points along the
Moselle as possible between Nancy and Metz. First Army’s center, which was
anchored at Metz, was the responsibility of SS General-Lieutenant Herman
Priess, commanding the 13th SS Corps, while First Army’s left wing at Nancy was
entrusted to General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Luttwitz,
commanding the 47th Panzer Corps.
From Metz to Nancy the Germans were deployed on the east
bank of the Moselle as follows: the 559th Volksgrenadier Regiment opposite
Thionville, Division Number 462 (partially composed of zealous officer cadets
from the Metz service schools) and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division at
Metz, the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division opposite Pont-a-Mousson, the 92nd
Luftwaffe Training Regiment opposite Marbache, the 3rd Parachute Replacement
Regiment in front of Nancy in a westward loop of the river, and the 553rd
Volksgrenadier Regiment inside Nancy. All of these units suffered serious
armored and antitank deficiencies. Despite the impressive numbers, the only
armored unit initially available to Knobelsdorff was the 106th Panzer Brigade,
one of the first of the newly formed panzer units with a full battalion of
Panther tanks, which constituted First Army’s thin operational reserve.
Knobelsdorff’s Blunder
On Patton’s left wing, Walker’s XX Corps began probing the
Metz defenses on September 7. Maj. Gen. Leroy Irvin’s 5th Infantry Division
pushed across the swollen waters of the flooded Metz River the following day to
gain a precarious bridgehead at Dornot, five miles south of Metz. Constant
shelling from German long-range guns stationed at Fort Driant, an elevated
outpost on the west bank of the Moselle, made it impossible for U.S. engineers
to lay a bridge at that crossing. What’s more, a series of determined
counterattacks by the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division kept the U.S. infantry
from expanding the bridgehead. After 48 hours of hard fighting, the bridgehead
was abandoned.
North of Metz, Third Army’s left flank lay exposed, and
Knobelsdorff sent the 106th Panzer Brigade to attack the Americans in an effort
to keep them off balance and slow their efforts to cross the Moselle. Although
the 106th Panzer Brigade was led by veterans from the Eastern Front, its crews
had received very little training and the brigade suffered from a severe shortage
of communications equipment essential to coordinate an assault. Nevertheless,
Knobelsdorff secured permission from Hitler to use the brigade for a quick
strike provided he return it to First Army reserve within 48 hours.
After some confusion as to the location of their target,
which was Maj. Gen. Raymond McLain’s 90th Division of Walker’s XX Corps, the
Germans regrouped on the evening of September 7 and advanced after midnight in
two columns through the village of Briey toward the American position. Having
failed to reconnoiter the American lines, the Germans blundered into a hornets’
nest.
Men of the U.S. 5th Infantry Division hug the walls in one
of the suburbs of Metz in early September 1944. Patton’s rapid advance across
France came to an abrupt halt at Metz, due to fuel shortages, deteriorating
weather conditions, and increased enemy resistance.
Men of the U.S. 5th Infantry Division hug the walls in one
of the suburbs of Metz in early September 1944. Patton’s rapid advance across
France came to an abrupt halt at Metz, due to fuel shortages, deteriorating
weather conditions, and increased enemy resistance.
The main column found itself in the midst of the 90th
Division headquarters at 3 am, and several Panthers engaged an M4 Sherman
guarding McLain’s command post situated on a knoll. The German armored column
continued south, hoping to stampede the American soldiers into abandoning their
positions. But the Americans stood their ground. McLain issued orders for the
nearest infantry regiments to converge on the enemy column.
At daybreak, the 358th Infantry Regiment attacked the column
with a wide range of antitank weapons including bazookas, 3-inch guns, and 105
mm howitzers. The turning point in the battle came when a U.S. artillery
observer directed more than 300 howitzer rounds onto a German column lined up
on a sunken road in preparation for an assault on the village of Mairy. The
strike destroyed five Panthers and 20 half-tracks. When the Germans attempted
to withdraw, they found their escape route blocked by the 359th Infantry
Regiment moving east to cut them off. Altogether, the 106th Panzer Brigade lost
30 tanks and 60 halftracks, which greatly reduced the role it would play in
subsequent operations.
Finding A Crossing Point
Irwin’s 5th Infantry Division made another effort to secure
a bridgehead across the Moselle at Arnaville, a short march south of Dornot, on
September 10. This time the engineers were able to construct a bridge under the
cover of darkness, but the bridgehead was again subjected to concentrated
shelling by long-range guns from the Metz defenses and also from counterattacks
by various elements of all three of the German Panzergrenadier divisions
defending the Moselle. Against such odds, a breakout at that location was not
deemed feasible.
Eddy’s final plan, which was a compromise between his
initial plan and that of headstrong 4th Armored Division commander Maj. Gen.
John Wood, called for Brig. Gen. Holmes Dager’s Combat Command B (CCB) to
assist the 35th Infantry Division south of Nancy, and Colonel Bruce Clark’s
Combat Command A (CCA) to be held in reserve to exploit whichever crossing
offered the most promise for a rapid breakout.
Heavy Resistance Across the Moselle
Initially, at least, Eddy’s XII Corps suffered setbacks as
severe as those experienced by Walker’s corps to its north. Having reached the
Moselle as early as September 5, the 80th Division attempted to gain a foothold
on the eastern bank at Pont-a-Mousson. A spearhead of the 317th Infantry
Regiment crossed the river in boats, but the following morning they were
bombarded by German artillery and mortars, which forced them into their
foxholes. The next morning, elements of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division
overran the bridgehead, killing 300 Americans.
But there were simply too many crossing points for the
Germans to contest every one with such promptness as they had shown at Dornot,
Arnaville, and Pont-a-Mousson. At Toul, where a great bend in the Moselle
channeled the Moselle away from Nancy, the Germans were content to allow
McBride’s 319th Infantry Regiment to cross unopposed on September 5.
Nevertheless, the Germans established strong defensive positions in two
dilapidated French fortresses that effectively blocked the western approaches
to the city. The Americans captured the northern fort almost immediately, but
German paratroopers held out in the southern fort for five days.
By September 10, Baade’s 35th Infantry Division was in force
along the western bank of the Moselle south of Nancy. The 134th Infantry
Regiment was ordered to cross on the left below Nancy, and the 137th Infantry
Regiment on the right. The 134th was fortunate to find a bridge intact and
threw a battalion across the river. But its fortune ended there. That evening
German artillery brought down the bridge, and the 104th Panzergrenadier
Regiment attacked with armor support in the dark of night, overrunning the
bridgehead. Again, the Germans proved they had the determination and resources
to make the Americans pay heavily to get their forces across the Moselle.
Still, the 137th Infantry Division that same day managed to
establish several small bridgeheads on the eastern bank. Not content to wait
for the infantry, the vanguard of Dager’s CCB managed to ford the Moselle at
Bayon, where the river’s height was substantially lower because water was
diverted to fill canals on each side.
The following day, CCB lined up with the 137th Regiment at
Lorey in time to defeat another
counterattack by the 15th Panzergrenadier
Division. On September 12, engineers had laid a 168-foot pontoon bridge across
the Moselle that enabled the rest of the 35th Infantry Division and the
remaining tanks of CCB to cross to the east bank, Two days later, CCB had
pushed through light enemy resistance to reach the Marne-Rhine Canal seven
miles beyond the Moselle.
CCA’s Breakthrough
Following the setback at Pont-a-Mousson, McBride ordered his
men to attempt another crossing four miles south at Dieulouard. The men of the
317th Infantry Regiment managed to cross a bridge left intact and braced
themselves for a counterattack. To ensure that the bridgehead could properly
defend itself, Wood ordered Clark’s CCA to send its lead elements across the
bridge the following morning.
As expected, the Germans counterattacked at 1 pm on
September 13 just as CCA began crossing the bridge. The 37th Tank Battalion,
led by the hard-charging Lt. Col. Creighton Abrams, brushed aside German
resistance and turned north to gain the east-west road leading to Nomeny.
This dramatic entrance to the battle by CCA caught the
Germans off guard and paid large dividends. In the first day alone, CCA’s
vanguard had advanced nearly 20 miles and destroyed a dozen enemy tanks and 85
half-tracks and captured 350 prisoners. With the vise tightening on Nancy,
Blaskowitz ordered the 553rd Volksgrenadier Division to pull out of the Nancy
pocket before it was cut off.
Abrams received orders from Wood to pivot south toward
Arracourt, where he would be in a position to link up with CCB and complete the
encirclement of Nancy. Although ordered to avoid German forces concentrated at
Chateau-Salins, Abrams nevertheless overtook an armored column from the 15th
Panzergrenadier Division and, in another stunning attack, captured or destroyed
26 armored vehicles and took 400 prisoners. Over the next four days, CCA raided
the countryside around Arracourt, managing to destroy more enemy tanks and
vehicles at a cost of only a half dozen M4 Sherman tanks.
Leclerc’s Resounding Victory at Dompaire
Two days before, Bradley had called Patton and First Army
Commander Maj. Gen. Courtney Hodge to his headquarters at Dreux and informed
them that the supply situation was dire. If Third Army was unable to cross the
Moselle by September 14, Bradley told Patton, it would have to go over to the
defensive.
The very notion was unpalatable to Old Blood and Guts. “Had
I not secured a good bridgehead by that time, I was to stop arguing and assume
the mournful role of a defender,” Patton said. On the day of the deadline,
Patton reported to Bradley that the southern wing of Third Army had broken out
of its bridgeheads and was in position to continue pushing east.
Bradley, who found the report satisfactory, passed the news
to Eisenhower that Third Army was indeed across the Moselle in strength. Patton
spent so much time cajoling Bradley for permission to continue his advance east
and additional reinforcements that he was seemingly oblivious to the stiffening
enemy resistance and to evidence that the Germans were amassing substantial
reinforcements in the Nancy sector.
But his cajoling paid off, as Bradley had been working hard
to ensure that Haislip’s XV Corps, which had been helping to clear the lower
Seine of German forces, would join Third Army on its southern flank. Haislip’s
arrival in early September disrupted a key element of Hitler’s plan for a
counterattack against Third Army by denying the Germans a staging area on the
west side of the Moselle from which they might isolate American forces on the
east side.
In a two-day pitched battle at Dompaire that began on
September 12, a battle group from Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc’s 2nd French
Armored Division of Haislip’s Corps smashed the 112th Panzer Brigade of
Luttwitz’s 47th Corps, which had been sent to check Haislip’s advance. The
Germans failed to reconnoiter enemy positions, and their replacement tank crews
were no match for Leclerc’s veteran troops.
As a result, the 112th Panzer Brigade lost 69 of its 90
tanks. Leclerc also benefited from repeated tactical air strikes by P-47
Thunderbolts of Brig. Gen. Otto Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command. The
destruction of the 112th Panzer Brigade occurred less than a week after the
equally embarrassing debut of the 106th Panzer Brigade on Third Army’s northern
flank. Taken together, the losses seriously compromised the impending
large-scale counterattack that Manteuffel was charged with executing.
Patton’s Planned Advance on the Rhine
Patton began drafting plans for Third Army’s advance east
toward the Rhine as early as September 14. He did not expect to encounter
substantial resistance until he reached the West Wall. “I was convinced then …
there were no Germans ahead of us except those we were actually fighting. In
other words, they had no depth,” Patton said.
His plan called for a narrowing of the front, with two corps
abreast and one in reserve. Once Third Army reached the West Wall, Patton
intended to concentrate his forces to achieve a breach. He was confident that
Eddy’s 35th Division, with close support of the 4th Armored, could achieve a
breach and hold it open to allow Third Army’s armored divisions to punch
through the wall. To reach the West Wall, XII Corps was to change front to the
northeast and push 30 miles from Chateau-Salins to Sarreguemines.
Though Patton had hoped XII Corps would be ready to resume
its advance on September 16, Eddy informed Patton that his troops would not be
ready to resume their eastward advance until the 19th, after they had mopped up
German forces behind their lines. The delay would prove a costly one. Patton
had been correct that the Germans possessed no defense in depth immediately
after Third Army crossed the Moselle. But by the time Eddy was ready to resume
his advance, Manteuffel’s Fifth Army had materialized as if out of thin air.
Manteuffel’s Counterattack
As Third Army firmly established itself on the east bank of
the Moselle at Nancy, capturing not only crossing points but also key
crossroads on the east bank, the Germans had to postpone their counterattack
several times and continually revise it to adjust to new events. Indeed, the
advance of Haislip’s XV Corps prevented German forces from assembling for their
attack on the west bank of the Moselle, where they might cut off the forces on
the east bank. Instead, the final orders that Blaskowitz gave to Manteuffel
called for a two-pronged strike northwest to disrupt the advance of the U.S.
4th Armored Division and retake the crossroads at Chateau-Salins.
Hitler, who reluctantly agreed to a far less ambitious
counterattack than initially envisioned, issued orders for the German attack to
begin on September 18. Manteuffel, who had arrived to take command of Fifth
Army in the field only a week before, pleaded for yet another extension,
arguing that his forces were not strong enough to achieve their objective. His
pleas fell on deaf ears, and he prepared to make do with the untrained and
understrength units he had been given.
The reconstituted Fifth Panzer Army was inserted into Blaskowitz’s
Army Group G between First Army to the north and the Nineteenth Army to the
south. Luttwitz’s 47th Panzer Corps, constituting the left flank, consisted of
the understrength 21st Panzer Division, the untested but intact 111th Panzer
Brigade, and the remnants of the 112th Panzer Brigade. General der
Panzertruppen Walter Krueger’s 58th Corps, which formed the right wing,
comprised the 15th Panzergrenadier Division and the also untested but intact
113th Panzer Brigade.
The new panzer brigades each had a battalion of
Panzergrenadiers drawn from the three Panzergrenadier divisions already in
Lorraine. The 111th and 113th Panzer Brigades boasted two tank battalions, one
of 45 Panthers and the other of 45 Mark IVs. The 112th Panzer Brigade decimated
by the clash at Dompaire, had only two dozen serviceable tanks. For its part,
the 15th Panzergrenadier Division had three dozen Mark IV tanks. Significantly,
none of the panzer brigades had either organic artillery or reconnaissance
vehicles.
Valiant Defense by the 704th at Lunéville
Scouts from the U.S. 42nd Cavalry Squadron detected a German
column approaching from the south toward Lunéville at 7 am on September 18. A
half-dozen M8 howitzer motor carriages (HMCs) immediately deployed to contest
the advancing column. The Panthers knocked out three of the lightly armored
HMCs in short order. Despite the ferocity of the attack, the cavalry held on
for four hours before it finally withdrew into the town.
American radios crackled throughout the morning with
requests to rush immediate support to Lunéville. Elements of the 4th and 6th
Armored Divisions, the latter which had been serving as Third Army’s rear
guard, and other units began converging on the town in response. By early
afternoon, the Germans were fighting their way into the southern end of the
town. Through skilled use of defensive positions, the Americans stopped the
Germans from capturing the town. Some of the hardest fighting was done by the
704th Tank Destroyer (TD) Battalion.
The type of close-range fighting that day is exemplified by
an encounter between an M18 Hellcat of the 704th against a pair of Panther
tanks. 2nd Lt. Richard Buss, commanding a platoon of M18s, ordered one of his
vehicles to take up a well-protected position behind a railroad embankment with
only its barrel visible. From there, the vehicle fired an armor-piercing shell
into the side of a Panther in a field 300 yards away.
“Suddenly, I saw the billowing of flames,” Buss said. “The
flames were transparent orange, rising with startling swiftness. They rose through
the branches of the trees to a height of 60 feet. When I looked for a second
target, it was gone.”
With that measure of skill, the 704th managed that day to
destroy eight Panthers without losing a single tank destroyer. When Manteuffel
learned that the 111th had become bogged down in Lunéville, he ordered it to
break off the engagement and bypass the town to the east. As for Patton, he
incorrectly dismissed the action as nothing more than another failed local
counterattack. “I was determined that the attack on the Siegfried Line should
go on in spite of what had happened in Lunéville,” he said.
Abrams’s Ambush
That evening Manteuffel made substantial adjustments to the
German plan of attack. Because
Haislip’s corps threatened his left flank, a
substantial part of Luttwitz’s corps was directed to take up a defensive
stance. To compensate for a reduction in forces, the main objective was
switched to a strike toward Nancy to relieve those elements of the 553rd
Volksgrenadier still fighting their way out of the tightening pocket.
Manteuffel’s attack for the following day involved a
coordinated strike toward Arracourt using the 111th and 113th Panzer Brigades
from Luttwitz’s and Krueger’s corps, respectively. Unfortunately for the
Germans, the 111th Panzer Brigade became lost in unfamiliar countryside and
didn’t reach the staging area at Bures until late afternoon on the 19th. This
meant that two columns of tanks and half-tracks from the 113th would have to
carry the objective themselves.
The eastern thrust of the 113th Panzer Brigade’s attack that
day was aimed at Companies C and D of the 37th Tank Battalion guarding the
eastern and southern approaches to Arracourt. When a column of 11 panzers
appeared out of the mist that morning, three were immediately knocked out at
close range by Shermans belonging to 1st Platoon, Company C, of Abrams’s 37th
Tank Battalion in concealed positions.
The Germans, in an effort to regroup, turned southwest to
escape the ambush. Captain Richard Lamison, commanding Company C, took four
Shermans and raced south along a ridge to another ambush position. The Shermans
popped over the crest of the ridge and opened fire on the enemy tank column at
a range of 900 yards, destroying five enemy tanks by striking them in the side.
The Shermans then retreated behind the crest of the ridge and reappeared at
another point to finish off the three remaining Panthers.
Meanwhile, the western thrust of the 113th Panzer Brigade
that morning ran headlong into a platoon of four Hellcats from the 704th TD
Battalion, which had been informed of an attack that morning and taken a
defensive position in a depression in the landscape. A major firefight
developed that resulted in the destruction of seven enemy tanks at the cost of
three Shermans.
The Germans attacked again in the vicinity of Rechicourt in
the afternoon, but after losing another nine tanks they broke off the action.
The initiative then shifted to the Americans when a task force from Companies A
and B of the 37th Tank Battalion swept through Rechicourt, driving the Germans
beyond the town.
Total losses for the day were five Shermans and more than 40
Panther and Mark IV tanks. The light losses suffered by Abrams’s battalion were
a result of his crews using their mobility to offset the advantage enjoyed by
the Panther’s long, high-velocity 75mm gun over the Sherman’s short 75mm gun.
The American tank crews also benefited from a hydraulic turret that allowed
them to swing into firing position faster than the Germans’ slower hand-cranked
traverse.
Patton drove to the XII Corps front on September 19, where
he met first with Eddy and later with Wood. Patton told Wood to strike east the
following day in the belief that it would keep the Germans off balance. “This I
felt was particularly true against the Germans, because as long as you attack
them, they cannot find the time to plan how to attack you,” Patton said.
A Day of Heavy Losses
Near Moncourt, just east of Arracourt, a platoon of Mark IVs
and towed anti-tank guns ambushed Abrams’s Company C, leaving a half-dozen M4
tanks mangled. The tank battle raged well into the afternoon as Company B
arrived to help Abrams hold back the Germans. By the end of the day the Germans
had lost a dozen Mark IVs and six Panthers. It was an unusually costly day for
the Americans, who lost a dozen Shermans.
Balck Replaces Blaskowitz
After two days of hard fighting, the two sides braced for
more of the same. Fearing Hitler’s ire, Blaskowitz berated Manteuffel for
failing to make any noticeable gains and ordered him to continue the
counterattack regardless of the losses incurred. Meanwhile, Patton acknowledged
that he might have to delay his advance east. “It might be impossible to
complete the mission which we started out on, but we could kill a lot of
Germans trying,” he told Eddy.
Hitler, who had never liked Blaskowitz, sacked him on
September 21. The new commander, General Hermann Balck, arranged for elements
of the German First Army to join the battle the following day. The shift in
plans resulted in an ominous quiet on the front lines that day and led to
speculation as to whether the Germans had finally quit their offensive. As the
Americans prepared to resume their push east, the vanguard of CCA shifted north
toward Chateau-Salins. This meant that CCA was now on the left flank of the
Arracourt-Juvelize salient and CCB was on the right.
Out of the fog on September 22, the remaining tanks of the
111th Panzer Brigade punched like a steel fist through CCA’s cavalry screen
around Juvelize. In short order, more than a half-dozen M5 Stuart tanks sat
smoldering and crumpled in fields near the town. Once again, Company C of the
704th TD Battalion rushed forward to delay the advance supported by P-47s
firing rockets and machine guns.
The Hellcats bought precious time for Companies A and B of
the 37th Tank Battalion to rumble north from Lezey toward the battlefront.
Company A, advancing on the left, gained high ground west of Juvelize, and with
substantial artillery support, it checked the momentum of the enemy armor
pushing south.
Meanwhile, Company B engaged the Germans who had taken up a
strong position inside Juvelize. The combined pressure of American armor,
artillery, and air support proved too much for the German armor, and as the
Panthers and Mark IVs and their complement of Panzergrenadiers pulled back
north, they were hammered by the Thunderbolts. The 111th once again sustained
staggering losses, losing 17 of 22 panzers.
Manteuffel, who knew the attacks were hopeless but was under
orders from Balck to continue regardless of the cost, threw the remnants of the
111th and 113th against CCA again the following day, only to suffer further
tank losses. Equally devastating was the loss of both panzer brigade commanders
during the two-day assault on CCA’s left flank. During the fighting around
Juvelize, the Americans lost 14 Shermans and 7 Stuarts. The fighting resulted
in the final destruction of two panzer brigades. By the end of the day on
September 22, the 111th Panzer Brigade had only seven tanks from an original
strength of 90 when the offensive started a week before.
Patton on the Defensive
Patton received orders from Bradley on September 23 to
switch to a defensive position until further notice. Events in the northern
sector made it necessary to divert precious fuel and ammunition to British and
American units in that sector, which meant that Third Army would have
insufficient resources to sustain prolonged offensive action. The news came as
a hard blow to Patton, whose spirits had been riding high with the prospect of
pushing through the West Wall to the Rhine. In addition, Eisenhower and Bradley
had decided to transfer Haislip’s XV Corps to Lt. Gen. Jacob Dever’s Sixth Army
leaving Patton once again with just two corps. In response to the changing circumstances,
Patton issued orders on September 24 for CCA to pull back from Juvelize to
Arracourt to lessen its exposure to any subsequent enemy attacks.
Balck expanded the fight by committing units from
Knobelsdorff’s First Army to the battle on September 24. He ordered
Knobelsdorff to attack Dager’s CCB with the 559th Volksgrenadier Division and
the remnants of the 106th Panzer Brigade. Unlike Manteuffel’s forces,
Knobelsdorff’s had artillery with which to support an attack. A heavy artillery
barrage preceded an attack near Chateau-Salins by two regiments supported by
tanks across flat ground against U.S. forces in defensive positions on a long
ridge.
The Sherman crews could do little to deter the advancing
Panthers because of the excellent sloped and thick frontal armor the enemy
tanks possessed. To descend the ridge and maneuver against the Panthers would
have exposed the Shermans to the Panthers’ highly effective guns. The Shermans
therefore attempted to use the ridge for cover and engage the Panthers head-on,
with disappointing results.
Although the day was cloudy and wet, two squadrons of P-47s
from the 405th Fighter Squadron were able to navigate to the area using their
cockpit instruments and instructions from ground spotters. They swooped in at
extremely low level, catching the German tank crews by surprise. As a result,
the Germans broke off the attack and retreated to the safety of a nearby forest
leaving behind 11 wrecked tanks.
Panzer Attack on Moyenvic
Because Knobelsdorff had no better luck than Manteuffel
against the Americans, Balck returned control of the offensive back to
Manteuffel. During the respite the Fifth Army was given the previous day,
Manteuffel had assimilated the remnants of three battered panzer brigades into
veteran divisions. The German high command also reinforced the Fifth Panzer
Army with Gen. Lt. Wend von Wietersheim’s 11th Panzer Division.
In effort to ensure greater success, Manteuffel ordered a
detailed reconnaissance of enemy positions. German scouts reported to the Fifth
Army commander that the crossroads of Moyenvic, four miles northeast of
Arracourt and three miles west of Juvelize, was unguarded and could readily
serve as the gateway for an attack. Having mustered 50 tanks for the attack,
Manteuffel ordered Wietersheim to capture Moyenvic and inflict as much damage
as possible on CCA. The Germans gained considerable ground on the morning of
September 25, but the attack ground to a halt when the Germans were unable to
dislodge CCA units from high ground northeast of Arracourt.
Q-Patton MAP
The attack on the 25th was not substantial enough to disrupt
a shuffling of U.S. forces in the Arracourt sector. The 37th Tank Battalion was
sent to the rear to rest and refit. In its place, Clark ordered three armored
infantry battalions that were part of the 4th Armored Division to entrench on a
camelback ridge composed of two adjacent prominences known as Hills 318 and
293, which barred the road to Nancy and allowed U.S. guns to sweep German
positions to the east and south.
In addition, Wood ordered CCB to shift to CCA’s right flank
to cover the ground between Rechicourt and the Marne-Rhine Canal. To cover
CCB’s former position in the line, Baade’s 35th Infantry Division advanced to a
new position west of Chateau-Salins. The Germans, who observed the Americans
pulling out of Juvelize, occupied the abandoned town the following day.
The Fight For Hill 318 and Hill 265
Manteuffel’s plans for September 27 called for Wietersheim’s
11th Panzer Division to seize the
camelback and Arracourt, opening the road to
Nancy. The plan called for a diversionary attack at daybreak by elements of the
11th Panzer Division against the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion atop Hill 265,
another key position held by the Americans. The main attack would come from the
town of Bures to the south, where Manteuffel had scraped together a battle
group composed of 30 tanks and assault guns to capture the camelback.
The Germans attacking toward Hill 265 captured several key
towns, one of which was Xanrey, a few miles northwest of Arracourt. Yet
Abrams’s 35th Tank Battalion counterattacked in the afternoon and recaptured
the town in a fight that inflicted substantial casualties on the Germans.
Meanwhile, the main attack that morning by the Germans
against the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion of Dager’s CCB occupying the
camelback was broken up by the concentrated fire of six artillery battalions.
Wietersheim ordered the battle group to break off its attack until the
following day so that reinforcements could be sent to Bures. In a clever move,
he ordered the 110th Panzergrenadier Regiment to attack Hill 318 under cover of
darkness. The Panzergrenadiers methodically fought their way up the southern
slope, clearing Americans from their foxholes. By dawn the Germans had seized
the crest of Hill 318.
Control of the crest of Hill 318 shifted back and forth on
September 28. Both sides employed heavy guns to shell enemy forces clinging to
their respective slopes. While the fighting raged, P-47s flew repeated sorties
against Bures, through which the Germans were funneling fresh troops and
ammunition into the battle. Desperate to achieve their objective, the Germans
toiled throughout the day to construct strongpoints and establish camouflaged
positions on the southern slope to support their attack. Charging up the slope
after nightfall, the Germans once again seized the crest, forcing the Americans
to retreat to the northern slope.
The Germans attacked along the entire line on September 29,
and Wietersheim committed his final reserve of 40 tanks to the fight for Hill
318. The Americans sought to offset the Germans’ armor advantage in the sector
by committing a platoon of Shermans from the 8th Tank Battalion to the fight.
The day dawned with a thick blanket of fog shrouding the crest of the hill. The
Shermans, which went into action in the morning, knocked out eight enemy tanks
in quick order.
Before more German tanks could ascend the hill, P-47s
swooped in with bombs and rockets after the fog burned off, breaking up a
counterattack. Although the Panzergrenadiers on the crest had managed to hold
on during the morning, the combined pressure of American ground fire and air
strikes finally broke the enemy’s nerve and the ground troops began retreating
down the southern slope in the afternoon.
To the north, German infantry launched a determined attack
to seize Hill 265, but they could not prevail against entrenched forces with a
clear advantage in artillery support. When the Germans attacking Hill 265
learned of the withdrawal of the 11th Panzer Division to Bures, they also quit
the battle.
Patton’s Lessons From Arracourt
Like his counterpart, Balck was loath to go on the defensive
but found he had no choice. Balck requested that Rundstedt provide Army Group G
with three fresh divisions and 80 additional tanks and assault guns to continue
the fight. But his request was denied as by then both sides had shifted the
bulk of their resources to the northern sector.
Although the 4th Armored Division lost 48 tanks in the
fighting around Arracourt in September, the Germans lost 285, which constituted
most of the replacement tanks sent to the Western Front that fall. From the
standpoint of losses in men and equipment, the Arracourt battles were a
resounding victory for the Americans. Still, Walker’s XX Corps remained stalled
before Metz, even though Eddy’s XII Corps had advanced well beyond its Moselle bridgeheads.
Patton’s triumph of the summer in which Third Army raced
across France against light opposition had given way to the hard reality of
bitter fighting along the Moselle line. Patton’s notion that Third Army could
cross the Moselle with ease and cover the 40 miles from the river to the West
Wall in a matter of weeks had been shattered by Manteuffel’s determined, if
futile, counterattack in September.
Patton had seriously underestimated the Germans’ ability to
recover from setbacks and mount a tenacious defense as the Western Allies
neared the German border. The initial counterattacks against Third Army’s
bridgeheads should have convinced him that the enemy was regaining strength.
Old Blood and Guts’s fixation with supply problems and haggling with his
superiors over reinforcements had distracted him from the detailed planning
necessary to get Third Army’s divisions across the Moselle as quickly as
possible. What’s more, his decision to advance on a broad front ran contrary to
the general understanding that it was necessary to concentrate forces to create
a sizable breach worthy of exploiting in the enemy’s main line.
Patton would face significant leadership and tactical
challenges in the region in the months following the Arracourt clashes. His
high hopes for a rapid advance to the West Wall would be dashed as heavy rains
over the next two months restricted Third Army’s tank columns to primary roads
and sharply curtailed tactical air support. Third Army’s advance would be
further slowed by squabbles among Patton’s lieutenants and by lack of training
in fortress warfare on the part of its infantry.
To succeed in Lorraine, Patton would have to exercise
careful planning, make quick tactical adjustments, and adjust his goals and
expectations when the weather failed to cooperate. The Lorraine campaign would
test Patton and his men as they had never been tested before.
